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Abstract 
The board of directors is a group of people whose decision making can affect company life. In particular, the 
decision to have more liabilities than equity capital, makes a firm more aggressive than others in the market. The 
aim of this paper is to test the relationship between some demographic characteristics of directors and the firm’s 
propensity to risk. In particular our analysis consider gender, age of the directors, independence and educational 
level. Moreover work experiences are considered. The results obtained should be considered by regulators and 
firm statutes as guidelines for future board composition.  
Keywords: board of directors; decision making; corporate governance; leverage ratio  
1. Introduction 
Generally, boards of directors have at least four important functions: monitoring and controlling managers, 
providing information and counsel to managers, monitoring compliance with applicable laws and regulations, 
and linking the corporation to the external environment (Mallin, 2004; Monks & Minow, 2003). Decisions taken 
by a board of directors should ensure the smooth running of the business, not only in terms of pursuing 
short-term economic interests, but also bearing in mind the future of the company and its long-term 
development.  
The board of directors is composed of humans who have a natural tendency towards optimism (Kahneman, 
2011). In particular, they may be victims of ‘groupthinking’ (Janis, 1971) or a tendency for a group to converge 
to the same, often optimistic, beliefs. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) referencing Janis (1971) point out that 
‘organizational optimism’ is self-reinforcing and pessimists and critical argument are ignored. One important 
task of the board of directors is to monitor the risk level of the company measured by the leverage ratio. The 
leverage ratio is the level of a company’s debt related to its equity capital. A company with a higher leverage 
ratio is considered aggressive because it has more liabilities and less equity and therefore it may increase the 
probability of default (Agrawal, 2015) with dangerous consequences for stakeholders (Tsai et al., 2015).  
Considering a sample of Italian listed companies, this paper aims to examine the relationship between their 
company risk level and the demographic characteristics of board members. The results obtained should be taken 
into consideration by firms and regulators in order to establish the composition of the board of directors.  
2. Hypotheses Development 
The demographic characteristics considered in the analysis are: 
Gender diversity – It is well-established that women and men behave differently. Generally, women are more 
risk-averse (e.g. Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998), whether they act individually or in making a team decision, 
while men are more overconfident than women (e.g. Lundberg et al., 1994; Barber & Odean, 2000). Bearing 
these differences in mind, in this paper we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: A larger number of female directors reduces the company risk level.  
Board independence – The ability of a board to act as an effective monitoring mechanism lies in its 
independence from management (Beasley, 1996; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The presence of independent directors 
is likely to enhance the levels of cognitive conflict on the board. In fact, independent directors share fewer 
ijef.ccsenet.org International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 9, No. 4; 2017 
120 
experiences with management and they are liable to think more freely with regard to the firm’s goals and 
possible alternatives. Thus the percentage of independent directors on a board is likely to have a direct negative 
effect on board cohesion (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), which is considered one of the antecedent conditions of 
groupthink (Janis, 1971). In this paper we test the following hypothesis: 
H2: A larger number of independent directors reduces the company risk level. 
Age of board members – Botwinick (1977) and Burke and Light (1981) show that cognitive abilities including 
learning ability, memory and reasoning decrease as people age. Moreover, Carlson and Karlsson (1970) and 
Vroom and Pahl (1971) demonstrate that older executives tend to avoid risky decisions. Campbell (1987) 
highlights that younger managers seem to handle new and creative ideas better than older managers; according to 
Guthrie and Olian (1991) they tend to implement more risky and innovative growth strategies. We test the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: Older boards of directors tend to reduce the company risk level. 
Educational background and work experience of board members – Hambrick and Mason (1984) highlight the 
fact that strategies and effectiveness of an organization are substantially shaped by the demographic 
characteristics of top executives such as educational level, age, tenure, and gender. 
In many studies (e.g. Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; 
Wailderdsak & Suehiro, 2004) educational level is considered as a good proxy for human capital, knowledge, or 
intellectual competence. In literature not only is the educational level taken into consideration, but also the 
subject studied is considered. Christy et al. (2010) show that the proportion of board members holding a financial 
degree is negatively associated with the market risk of equity in Australia. In theory, we believe that graduates 
could positively affect the decision making process among board members; however we believe that degrees do 
not confer the same level of skills. In a recent study, Litov et al. (2013) find that lawyers directors reduce 
corporate risk-taking and increase firm value. Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) argue that directors with academic 
backgrounds can enhance the competitive advantage of firms by facilitating access to and the absorption of 
external knowledge spillover. Considering the complex and sensitive decisions that a board of directors is called 
upon to assume, we believe that to have a degree in economics can impact positively on the decisions taken in 
the company interests and consequently on its risk level. Hence, in this paper we test the following hypotheses: 
H4: Having a degree in economics reduces the company risk level. 
Moreover, other studies indicate that board diversity is an important factor influencing board efficacy and firm 
performance (Carter et al., 2003; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2011). Milliken and 
Martins (1996) note that diversity increases the aggregate level of resources at the group’s disposal but it is also 
associated with high levels of conflict, interaction difficulties, and lower levels of integration. Moreover, board 
members have few opportunities to diminish or smooth over the differences that separate them because they only 
interact periodically. Thus board diversity can lead to higher levels of cognitive conflicts (Williams & O’Reilly, 
1998) so boards whose members have diverse backgrounds are also likely to be less cohesive. Bearing in mind 
this uncertainty of guidance, in this paper we do not express a directional hypothesis but we test whether the 
diversification of degrees amongst board members and the diversification of board members’ work experiences 
affect (and how) the risk level of the company. 
3. Data and Methodology 
We consider 126 listed companies on the Italian Stock Exchange at the year-end from 2011 to 2013 belonging to 
three main economic sectors: industrial, consumer goods and services, and public services. We do not consider 
the financial sector in the analysis because the comprehensive set of reform measures to strengthen the 
regulation, supervision and risk of the banking sector, known as Basel III, had a strong impact on the 
determination of the leverage ratio of banks; for this reason we excluded this sector from the survey. We consider 
2011 as the first year of analysis because in that year the Italian Law 120/2011 established that the statute of each 
listed company must provide a policy for the allocation of directors that ensures balance between genders.  
We analysed the corporate governance annual reports published at the year-end on the Borsa Italiana web-site for 
each company in order to collect information about the name of each director engaged on the boards examined. 
Then we analysed more than 2,000 resumés with the aim of gathering information about gender, independence or 
lack thereof, age, whether they were graduates or not and types of degree, study abroad, and work experience.  
We collected the leverage ratio for each company examined from the Orbis database and we calculated the 
average leverage ratio for each sector considered in the analysis. Then we compared the leverage ratio of each 
company belonging to each sector with the sector average  leverage ratio; the firm with a leverage ratio higher 
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than the sector average  leverage ratio is considered aggressive. 
Thus the dependent variable in this paper, named ‘aggressive’ get 0 in the case the firm leverage ratio is lower 
than the sector leverage ratio the firm belongs to; it get 1 in the case the firm leverage ratio is higher than the 
sector leverage ratio the firm belongs to. Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample among sectors and the 
number of aggressive firms; Table 2 presents and describes the variables used in the analysis. 
 
Table 1. The sample distribution among sectors and the number of aggressive firms (2011-2013)  
 Sector 
 Industrial Consumer goods and services Public service Tot 
Number of observations 192 78 108 378 
Number of aggressive firms 74 28 36 138 
 
Table 2. The variables used in the analysis 
Variables Description 
Dependent variable  
aggressive 
Is a dichotomic variable (0-1). If 1 it identifies a firm with a leverage ratio higher than the sector average 
leverage ratio. 
Independent variables  
%women Is the percentage of females on each board for each company. 
%ind Is the percentage of independent directors on the board for each company. 
age Is the average age of board members per each company. 
%graduates Is the percentage of graduate members for each company. 
%law_graduates Is the percentage of Law degrees on each board for each company. 
%eco_graduates Is the percentage of degrees in Economics for each board for each company. 
%eng_graduates Is the percentage of Engineering graduates for each board for each company. 
%accountants Is the percentage of accountants on each board for each company. 
%lawyers Is the percentage of lawyers per each board for each company. 
%engineers Is the percentage of engineers in each board for each company. 
%professors Is the percentage of academic professors in each board for each company. 
%entrepreneurs Is the percentage of entrepreneurs or businessman on each board for each company. 
%studyabroad Is the percentage of directors who studied abroad. 
inter_skills Is the percentage of board members with international skills and experience. 
n_directors Is the number of directors in each board at the year-end. 
tot_asset Is the logarithm of the total asset at the year-end. 
 
To test the impact of the concentration and the diversification of degrees amongst board members for each board 
of directors, the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) (Note 1) is calculated using the following equation:  
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, 100
                               (1) 
In equation 1, si,t is the percentage of degrees in Economics, in Law or in Engineering, i identifies the company 
examined from 1 to 126 per year t from 2011 to 2013. Using this index we can obtain the level of concentration 
for each degree considered and the level of degree diversification per board of directors. We also use the same 
index to calculate the level of concentration and/or diversification per each board of directors considering the 
work experiences of each member. 
We include three control variables in our analysis. The first one is the board size that is not a truly demographic 
attribute, but it is an important and much-studied board charateristic that is likely to have important effects on 
board functioning. Larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and skills at their disposal and the 
abundance of perspectives they assemble are likely to enhance cognitive conflict. However, at the same time, the 
difficulty inherent in coordinating the contributions of many members is likely to make it difficult for them to 
use their knowledge and skills effectively. Large boards may also have difficulty building interpersonal 
relationships owing to the potential for ‘social loafing’ that exists in large groups (Latané et al., 1979). The 
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second one is related to the sector (sector: industrial, consumer goods and services and public services) each 
company belongs to, and the third one is related to the total asset (tot_asset) at the year-end.  
Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis while the correlations between 
the independent variables used in the survey are shown in Table 4.    
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics (N=378; year 2011-2012-2013) 
Variable Mean Std. Dv. Min  Max 
Dependent Variable: aggressive     
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.3651 0.4820 
0.4471 
0.1833 
0 1 
Independent Variables     
%women 
Between 
Within 
0.1231 0.1065 
0.0766 
0.0743 
0 0.5 
%ind 
Between 
Within 
0.4478 0.1802 
0.1287 
0.1264 
0.14 1 
age 
Between 
Within 
57.53 4.6523 
3.5039 
3.0711 
45.69 69 
%graduates 
Between 
Within 
0.79 0.1929 
0.1510 
0.1205 
0.2 1 
%law_graduates 
Between 
Within 
0.1264 0.1187 
0.0937 
0.0731 
0 0.57 
%eco_graduates 
Between 
Within 
0.3485 0.1765 
0.1334 
0.1160 
0 0.71 
%eng_graduates 
Between 
Within 
0.1524 0.1543 
0.1156 
0.1027 
0 0.71 
%accountants  
Between 
Within 
0.1223 0.1257 
0.0987 
0.0783 
0 0.57 
%lawyers 
Between 
Within 
0.0614 0.0766 
0.0572 
0.0511 
0 0.44 
%engineers 
Between 
Within 
0.0140 0.0412 
0.0307 
0.0277 
0 0.22 
%professors 
Between 
Within 
0.0727 0.0986 
0.0754 
0.0636 
0 0.45 
%entrepreneurs  
Between 
Within 
0.0693 0.1044 
0.0747 
0.0731 
0 0.67 
studyabroad 
Between 
Within 
0.16 0.1713 
0.1224 
0.1202 
0 0.67 
int_skills 
Between 
Within 
0.2601 0.1953 
0.1579 
0.1154 
0 0.82 
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n_directors 
Between 
Within 
9.7407 3.1178 
2.2318 
2.1830 
4 23 
tot_asset 
Between 
Within 
13.3504 1.8940 
1.8961 
0.1056 
9.14 18.96 
Note. This table presents the main descriptive statistics of the variables considered in the survey: aggressive is a dichotomic variable (0-1) 
that indicates if the company leverage ratio is higher than the sector average leverage ratio; %women is the percentage of females on each 
board for each company; %ind is the percentage of independent directors on the board for each company; age is the average age of board 
members per each company; %graduates is the percentage of graduate members for each company; %law_graduates is the percentage of Law 
degrees on each board for each company; %eco_graduates is the percentage of degrees in Economics for each board for each 
company; %eng_graduates is the percentage of Engineering graduates for each board for each company; %accountants is the percentage of 
accountants on each board for each company; %lawyers is the percentage of lawyers per each board for each company; %engineers is the 
percentage of engineers in each board for each company; %professors is the percentage of academic professors on each board for each 
company; %entrepreneurs is the percentage of entrepreneurs or businessman on each board for each company; %studyabroad is the 
percentage of directors who studied abroad; inter_skills is the percentage of board members with international skills and experience; 
n_directors is the number of directors in each board; tot_asset is the logarithm of the total asset at the year-end.  
 
Table 4. Matrix correlation 
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n_directors 1                
%women -0.06 1               
%ind 0.11 -0.14 1              
age 0.21 -0.19 0.07 1             
%graduates 0.22 0.04 0.09 0.05 1            
%law_graduates 0.18 -0.21 0.10 0.13 0.28 1           
%eco_graduates 0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.08 0.36 -0.01 1          
%eng_graduates 0.02 0.08 -0.08 0.11 0.28 -0.22 -0.32 1         
%accountants -0.02 0.10 -0.05 -0.22 0.04 -0.07 0.35 -0.21 1        
%lawyers 0.09 -0.15 0.09 -0.04 0.21 0.59 0.08 -0.19 0.01 1       
%engineers 0.13 -0.09 -0.05 0.05 0.10 -0.11 -0.04 0.24 0.13 0.04 1      
%professors 0.26 0.03 0.15 0.06 0.20 -0.04 -0.07 0.23 -0.17 -0.03 -0.03 1     
%entrepreneurs -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.13 0.02 0.05 -0.18 -0.06 0.08 -0.15 -0.24 1    
studyabroad 0.03 0.05 0.10 0 0.35 0.06 0.08 0.27 -0.30 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 -0.08 1   
int_skills 0.15 0 0.12 0.10 0.39 0.03 0.10 0.35 -0.22 -0.07 0.08 0.10 -0.10 0.68 1  
log_asset 0.20 -0.05 0.24 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.14 0 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.22 -0.10 0.13 0.19 1 
Note. This table shows the correlation between the variables used in the model: %women is the percentage of females on each board for each 
company; %ind is the percentage of independent directors on the board for each company; age is the average age of board members per each 
company; %graduates is the percentage of graduate members for each company; %law_graduates is the percentage of Law degrees on each 
board for each company; %eco_graduates is the percentage of degrees in Economics for each board for each company; %eng_graduates is 
the percentage of Engineering graduates for each board for each company; %accountants is the percentage of accountants on each board for 
each company; %lawyers is the percentage of lawyers for each board for each company; %engineers is the percentage of engineers on each 
board for each company; %professors is the percentage of academic professors on each board for each company; %entrepreneurs is the 
percentage of entrepreneurs or businessman on each board for each company; %studyabroad is the percentage of directors who studied 
abroad; inter_skills is the percentage of board members with international skills and experience; n_directors is the number of directors on 
each board; tot_asset is the logarithm of the total asset at the year-end.  
 
The methodology used in this paper comprises three steps: Step 1 is designed to study the relationship between 
the board members’ educational background and the company risk level; Step 2 studies the relationship between 
the board members’ work experiences and the company risk level and Step 3 considers the concentration and the 
diversification of graduates and work experiences inside the boards examined in relationship with the decision of 
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whether to be an aggressive firm or not. 
Step 1: educational background analysis 
To test the impact of educational background on the company risk level, we used the following regressions 
(please see Table 2 for the variables description):  
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝛼1:𝛽1%𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 +  𝛽2%𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4%𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽5%𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽6%𝑒𝑐𝑜_𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 
+ 𝛽7%𝑒𝑛𝑔_𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽8%𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽9𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽10𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
3
𝑖=1  𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑗
3
𝑗=1 + 𝜀  (2) 
Step 2: work experiences analysis  
To test the impact of directors’ work experience on the company risk level, we used the following regressions 
(please see Table 2 for the variables description):  
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝛼1+ 𝛽1%𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 +  𝛽2%𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3%𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4%𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽5%𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽6%𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠 
+ 𝛽7%𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽8%𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽9𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠  + 𝛽10𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +  𝛽11𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
3
𝑖=1  𝑖 +  ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑗
3
𝑗=1 + 𝜀                             (3) 
Step 3: concentration/diversification analysis  
To test the relationship between the concentration of degrees and the concentration of work experiences inside 
the board of directors and the company risk level, we used the following regressions (please see Table 2 for the 
variables description):  
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝛼1+ 𝛽1%𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 +  𝛽2%𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽4%𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 +  𝛽6𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 +  𝛽7𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 
+ 𝛽8𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽10𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 +  𝛽11𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 
+𝛽12𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐  + 𝛽13𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +  𝛽14𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
3
𝑖=1  𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑗
3
𝑗=1 + 𝜀      (4) 
where law_conc, eco_conc and eng_conc are dummies (0 or 1) that indicate respectively the concentration of 
degrees in Law, in Economics and in Engineering calculated with the HHI for each board for each company; 
accountants_conc, lawyers_conc, engineers_conc, prof_conc and entrepreners_conc are dummies (0 or 1) that 
indicate respectively the concentration of accountants, lawyers, engineers, professors and entrepreneurs 
calculated with the HHI for each board for each company; ε represents error.                         
To test the relationship between the diversification of degrees and of the work experiences inside the board of 
directors and the company risk level, we used the following regressions (please see Table 2 for the variables 
description):  
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝛼1+ 𝛽1%𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 +  𝛽2%𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒+𝛽4%𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠_𝑑𝑖𝑣 
+ 𝛽6𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠_𝑑𝑖𝑣  + 𝛽7𝑛_𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 +  𝛽8𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
3
𝑖=1  𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑡𝑗
3
𝑗=1 + 𝜀         (5) 
where 𝛼1 is a constant; studies_div and work_div are two dummy variables (0 or 1) which indicates the 
diversification of degrees and of the work experiences amongst the board members calculated with the HHI for 
each board for each company; ε represents error.  
4. Empirical Results 
Step 1 – Educational background analysis 
The results obtained by equation (2) are shown in Table 5. On the one hand, they highlight that the more 
graduates present on the board, the more aggressive the firms tend to be; on the other hand, the more degrees in 
Law and in Economics sitting on the board and the less aggressive the firms are.    
 
Table 5. The educational background regression results 
%women 2.111 
 (4.334) 
%ind -2.491 
 (2.660) 
age -0.0991 
 (0.0938) 
%graduates 4.755* 
 (2.829) 
%law_graduates -14.18*** 
 (4.078) 
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%eco_graduates -6.048* 
 (3.131) 
%eng_graduates -4.329 
 (4.042) 
%studyabroad 3.608 
 (2.837) 
n_directors -0.0597 
 (0.146) 
tot_asset 0.333 
 (0.321) 
macro1 -0.642 
 (1.274) 
macro3 -0.832 
 (1.412) 
t1 3.503*** 
 (0.939) 
t2 2.797*** 
 (0.928) 
Constant 0.477 
 (7.511) 
N. Obs 378 
Prob>χ2 0.000 
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Standard errors in parentheses). 
Note. This table presents the main results of our educational background analysis. To remind you: %women is the percentage of females on 
each board for each company; %ind is the percentage of independent directors on the board for each company; age is the average age of 
board members for each company; %graduates is the percentage of graduate members for each company; %law_graduates is the percentage 
of Law degrees on each board for each company; %eco_graduates is the percentage of degrees in Economics for each board for each 
company; %eng_graduates is the percentage of Engineering graduates for each board for each company; %studyabroad is the percentage of 
directors who studied abroad; n_directors is the number of directors on each board; tot_asset is the logarithm of the total asset at the year-end; 
sector indicates the macro-sectors the companies examined belong to (industrial, consumer goods and services, and public services 
respectively). 
 
This result confirms our hypothesis H4, probably because they are more aware of the high probability of default 
in the case of a high leverage ratio and the dramatic consequences. Degrees in Economics and in Law tend to 
reduce the company risk level. Thus, different degrees do not confer the same skills and knowledge. 
Step 2 – Works experience analysis 
Faced with the results obtained by equation (3) related to the work experiences analysis shown in Table 6, two 
main results are highlighted. The first one is that lawyers tend to be more risk adverse, confirming the result 
obtained in Step 1. According to the second one, the more engineers sitting on the board and the more aggressive 
the company tends to be, but probably without the adequate awareness.   
 
Table 6. The work experience regression results 
%women 2.747 
 (3.956) 
%ind -0.356 
 (2.551) 
age -0.219** 
 (0.0950) 
%accountants 0.358 
 (4.257) 
%lawyers -22.48*** 
 (5.312) 
%engineers 27.27*** 
 (10.10) 
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%professors 5.268 
 (4.809) 
%entrepreuners 3.462 
 (5.117) 
inter_skills 0.644 
 (2.588) 
n_directors 0.0527 
 (0.153) 
tot_asset 0.483* 
 (0.278) 
macro1 -0.742 
 (1.158) 
macro3 -0.856 
 (1.479) 
t1 3.690*** 
 (0.875) 
t2 2.683*** 
 (0.885) 
Constant 2.707 
 (7.218) 
N. Obs 378 
Prob>χ2 0.000 
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Standard errors in parentheses). 
Note. This table presents the main results of our work experience analysis. To remind you: %women is the percentage of females on each 
board for each company; %ind is the percentage of independent directors on the board for each company; age is the average age of board 
members for each company; %accountants is the percentage of accountants on each board for each company; %lawyers is the percentage of 
lawyers for each board for each company; %engineers is the percentage of engineers on each board for each company; %professors is the 
percentage of academic professors on each board for each company; %entrepreneurs is the percentage of entrepreneurs on each board for 
each company; inter_skills is the percentage of board members with international skills and experience; n_directors is the number of 
directors per board; tot_asset is the logarithm of the total asset at the year-end; sector indicates the macro-sectors the companies examined 
belong to (industrial, consumer goods and services, and public services respectively). 
 
Moreover, as indicated by the literature, the results obtained highlighted that older boards of directors tend to 
reduce the firm leverage ratio, thus our H3 is confirmed.  
Step 3: Concentration/diversification analysis  
Table 7 shows two kinds of results from equations (4) and (5) respectively: the one  related to the educational 
and work experiences concentration and the one related to the educational and work experiences diversification.  
 
Table 7. Concentration and diversification regression results 
Concentration analysis – Eq (4)  Diversification analysis – Eq (5) 
%women 3.751  %women 1.150 
 (4.005)   (3.289) 
%ind 1.695  %ind -0.233 
 (2.540)   (2.164) 
age -0.197**  age -0.208** 
 (0.100)   (0.0887) 
%graduates 3.258  %graduates 7.057*** 
 (2.381)   (2.223) 
law_conc 39.14  works_div 0.479 
 (8,459)   (0.988) 
eco_conc -2.362**  studies_div 4.447*** 
 (1.066)   (1.167) 
eng_conc 0.336  n_directors -0.191 
 (2.818)   (0.119) 
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accountants_conc 0.354  tot_asset 0.677** 
 (7.095)   (0.290) 
entrepreneurs_conc 2.624  macro1 0.841 
 (29.77)   (0.930) 
n_directors -0.259*  macro3 -0.575 
 (0.145)   (1.078) 
tot_asset 0.248  t1 2.812*** 
 (0.299)   (0.731) 
macro1 2.360**  t2 1.843** 
 (1.187)   (0.738) 
macro3 1.340  Constant -7.113 
 (1.439)   (6.516) 
t1 3.503***    
 (0.877)    
t2 2.482***    
 (0.906)    
Constant 2.246    
 (7.043)    
N. Obs 378  N. Obs 378 
Prob>χ2 0.0008  Prob>χ2 0.000 
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (Standard errors in parentheses). 
Note. This table presents the main results of concentration and diversification of degrees and work experiences on the company risk level. To 
remind you: %women is the percentage of females on each board for each company; %ind is the percentage of independent directors on the 
board for each company; age is the average age of board members for each company; %graduates is the percentage of graduates on each 
board; law_conc, eco_conc and eng_conc are dummies (0-1) that indicate the concentration of degrees in Law, Economics and Engineering 
respectively; accountants_conc, lawyer_conc, engineers_conc, professors_conc, entrepreneurs_con are dummies (0 or 1) that indicate, 
respectively, the concentration of accountants, lawyers, engineers, professors and entrepreneurs calculated with the HHI for each board for 
each company; studies_div and works_div are dummies (0-1) which indicate the diversification of degrees and of the work experiences 
among the board members calculated with the HHI for each board for each company; n_directors is the number of directors per board; 
tot_asset is the logarithm of the total asset at the year-end; sector indicates the sectors the companies examined belong to (industrial, 
consumer goods and services, and public services respectively).  
  
In terms of concentration, the main result obtained is that the concentration of degrees in Economics tend to be 
more conservative in decision making thus the firm is less aggressive. This result confirms and reinforces the 
one obtained in Step 1. There is no other significant relationship between educational or work experience 
concentration and the decision making regarding the firm’s leverage ratio. Instead, it is confirmed that an older 
board tends to be less aggressive. 
The diversification analysis confirms the previous result according to which the more degrees sitting on the 
board and the more aggressive the firms are. Moreover, the diversification of degrees tends to increase the 
leverage ratio of the firms examined. According to the authors, this result can be explained because the presence 
of heterogeneous degrees can make communication difficult among board members or directors that might not 
have specific expertise in corporate governance. However people very often tend not to admit their limitations, 
being overconfident and often guided by optimism and take decisions that are likely to be  risky. The last result 
of this step of analysis is that the larger the board of directors, the less aggressive the firms are. Our hypotheses 1 
and 2 are rejected. In fact, according to the results of this paper, women and independent directors have no 
significant impact on the company leverage ratio.  
5. Conclusions 
The board of directors’ decision making is fundamental to company prosperity over time. Many studies in 
literature examined the quantitative characteristics of boards of directors while very few studies considered the 
quality of its members, the directors. This study extends the literature about corporate governance and about the 
group-decision making by examining the composition of a sample of Italian listed company boards and also by 
analyzing the impact of the same members’ demographic characteristics and the companies risk level. In 
particular we test four hypotheses: 1) a large number of female directors reduces the company risk level. This 
hypothesis is rejected. 2) a large number of independent directors reduces the company risk level. This 
hypothesis is rejected. 3) older boards of directors tend to reduce the company risk level. This hypothesis is 
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confirmed. 4) having a degree in Economics reduces the company risk level. This hypothesis is confirmed. The 
results are particularly interesting because, on the one hand, they confirm some existing studies and, on the other 
hand, they open a new debate that may be of interest to the regulator, companies and investors.  
Based on the results obtained in this study, we are able to argue that the level of skills necessary to participate in 
corporate governance is not acquired with any kind of degree. We demonstrate that being a graduate is not 
enough to help company growth. In particular, based on the results obtained in this survey it is possible to 
identify a board composition that prefers degrees in Economics and in Law, in particular a concentration of 
degrees in Economics is well accepted in the aim of reducing the company risk level; lawyers operate in the 
same way while engineers seem to have a higher risk tendency. The diversification of work experiences has no 
impact on the company risk level; the diversification of degrees seems to drive board decision-making to a high 
risk level of the firm. 
Future researches might try to pursue this issue in order to provide new supports for regulators, for the 
institutional investors and for the whole market. 
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Note 
Note 1. The HHI is designed to measure industry concentration. The US Department of Justice associates the 
following threshold values with the HHI for particular use: an HHI below 1,000 signals a low concentration, 
while one above 1,800 signals a high concentration; an index between 1,000 and 1,800 shows a moderate 
concentration. 
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